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The dearth of cooperative and contentious collective action on the part
of the Egyptian urban poor by no means implies a lack of grassroots
activism. Conditioned by political and cultural constraints, the poor
instead resort to an alternative strategy—that of quiet encroachment.
Qualitatively different from defensive measures or coping mechanisms,
this strategy represents a silent, protracted, pervasive advancement
of ordinary people—through open-ended and fleeting struggles without
clear leadership, ideology or structured organization—on the propertied
and powerful in order to survive.
Asef Bayat, a guest editor of this issue, teaches sociology at the American University in Cairo. His
latent book. Street Politics: Poor People's Movements in Iran, 1977-1990, will be published in the
United States by Columbia University Press in October 1997.
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The proliferation of more than 100 squatter communitieswith some six million inhabitants signifies only one, but
perhaps the starkest, component of the growing socioeconomic
disparity1 in Cairo since Sadat's infitah ("opening up" or eco-
nomic liberalization) in 1974 and the more recent
implementation of the IMF's structural adjustment program.
Between 1981 and 1991, rural poverty doubled and urban
poverty increased more than 1.5 times.2 By the early 1990s,
more than half of Cairo and adjacent Giza were classified
either as "poor" or "ultra-poor."3 Millions of Cairenes are con-
sumed by their constant search for adequate food, shelter,
jobs and the maintenance of individual and familial dignity;
most are involved in the informal economy and live in infor-
mal communities.4
For some time, state safety nets, in particular populist
measures of protection, served to sustain low-income groups.
With the dawn of neo-liberalism in Egypt in the 1980s, as in
many other countries, the populist state has gradually with-
drawn its protection from the popular sectors—peasants,
workers and the urban poor. Although it is acknowledged that
the poor will suffer in the short-term, the trickle-down of na-
tional economic growth is expected in the long run to benefit
the poor as well. Thus far, however, there is no evidence to
suggest that this is actually the case. If anything, every sign
indicates increasing social inequality and impoverishment.
The Social Fund for Development (SFD)—a "safety net"
program capitalized by the World Bank and other bilateral
and multilateral donors at over $1 billion dollars and designed
to offset the negative impact of structural adjustment pro-
grams on the "losers" in the Egyptian economy—has
encountered innumerable problems in addressing its man-
date of reaching the poor through nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs)/' The SFD and its backers nonethe-
less remain optimistic about the ability of NGOs to enhance
structural adjustment without exacerbating poverty. Many
Egyptian NGOs—spread throughout many of Cairo's poorer
neighborhoods—specialize in relief work or in community
development activities, including poverty alleviation, income
generation and child protection. More than 100 NGOs are
active in the Sayyida Zeinab neighborhood in Cairo alone.
The extent of their effectiveness, however, remains unclear
due largely to the fact that an in-depth and comprehensive
evaluation of the NGOs' impact in Egypt has yet to be done.
The few available studies do not offer a bright picture.6 Al-
though these NGOs provide some services, credit and financial
assistance to the needy, their ability to sustain and empower
the lower class remains limited. Even the more efficient Chris-
tian and Islamic NGOs limit themselves largely to the ad hoc
provision of emergency services. While the activities of NGOs
in Egyptian society are surely a welcome development, one
should acknowledge that their meager resources cannot match
the magnitude of the needs of the urban poor in Cairo.
Poor Cairenes cope with these economic realities either by
stretching their resources to meet their needs or by cutting
down on their consumption. Thus, breadwinners are forced
to work longer hours, while other family members—prima-
rily women and children—must also work. Some resort to
selling their personal belongings for cash, begging and even
prostitution. They further decrease their expenditures by shar-
ing living spaces with relatives, purchasing low-quality food
and secondhand clothes which they may share with others
within the household, limiting health and education expenses,
and reducing daily meals to two or one.7 These practices are
as common now in Cairo as in New Delhi, Manila or Rio de
Janeiro.
Community Activism
Beneath these coping mechanisms, there is also a strong, if
quiet, tide of resentment, resistance and reclamation. When
opportunities arise, the poor do get involved in visible collec-
tive struggle. When opportunities to engage in suitable types
of social activism are unavailable, they may create them. Inaz
Tewfiq's account (in this issue) of the prolonged struggles of
the residents of Ezbat Mekawy is one example. In this low-
income neighborhood in Cairo, residents managed, through
several years of collective campaigning, to close down local
smelter plants which had caused major health and environ-
mental problems. They used traditional strategies of
communication within the community, as well as modern tac-
tics, such as engaging the media, lobbying politicians and
accessing the court system as a means of registering opposi-
tion.
Compared to the poor in Latin American and South Asian
cities, however, such overt and organized social activism is
quite rare among Cairo's poor.8 While the lower classes in
Cairo are aware of environmental problems, they do little to
address them through collective action, either through coop-
erative communal engagement to upgrade the community
itself, or through contentious protest actions. Social networks,
which extend beyond kinship and ethnicity, remain over-
whelmingly casual, unstructured and nonpolitical. (The
gamaiyyat, the informal credit system, is perhaps the most
important form of neighborhood networking in Cairo.) The
weakness of civic or non-kinship cooperation at the commu-
nity level only reinforces traditional hierarchical, paternalistic
relations with people depending more on local elders and prob-
lem solvers than on broad-based social activism.
Why are the poor of Cairo not as mobilized as their coun-
terparts, for example, in Mexico City or Tehran? In Monterey,
Mexico, shantytown dwellers were able to stop a freight train
full of corn as families rushed out "to fill pots and sacks full of
grain."9 In Iran, the protests of the urban poor in the early
1990s,1" notably the three-day riots in the neighborhood of
Islamshahr in Tehran, constituted one of the most significant
internal political challenges to the Islamic Republic."
One major reason for the lack of mass protest in Cairo is
the absence of structures that permit collective action in Egypt.
Sadat's "Emergency Law" restricts contentious collective ac-
tivities. Likewise, the present electoral structure in Egypt is
not as conducive to group mobilization as it is, for example, in
India or Turkey. In a truly competitive political system, po-
litical forces are compelled to bargain with, and thus mobilize,
the poor to win their electoral support. In Egypt, this hap-
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Fads and Figures on Cairo
Despite the attention focused on the problems of cities around the world—most recently at the Habitat II Conference in Istanbul—surprisingly
little comparable data on urban centers are available, as was found by the
World Resources Institute in preparing their 1996-97 World Resources re-
port. Population figures, for example, often vary depending on the definition
of the urban center concerned. In the case of Cairo, estimates of its popula-
tion range from a low of 9.7 million to a high of 12 million. This variation is
due, in part, to the fact that Cairo can be defined at least three ways: Cairo
City, metropolitan Cairo, and the Greater Cairo Region; Greater Cairo falls
under at least three separate jurisdictions—Cairo, Giza, and Qalyubia—
which further complicates the collection of data.
Population Density Greater Cairo: 40,000 persons per square kilometer; up to 100,000/km2 in older
districts.
Rate of Growth While Cairo City is now growing at a rate of less than two percent per year, other parts of
Greater Cairo are growing at a rate of more than three percent. If growth were to continue at just the two
percent rate, however, Cairo's population would double in 35 years.
Life Expectancy 65 years
Infant Mortality 35.1 per 1,000 live births (1991), Cairo City only. As in many developing countries,
infant mortality rates are lower in urban than in rural areas. A comparison of data from the mid-1980s with
that of other major cities placed Cairo on a par with Bombay and Istanbul.
Maternal Mortality 200 women die for every 100,000 live births (1992), Cairo City only. Egypt's overall
maternal mortality rate of about 250 per 100,000 live births is in the range of such countries as Guatemala
and Mexico, but roughly twice as high as the rate in such ME/NA countries as Tunisia, Iran and Syria.
Adult Literacy 69.3 percent total; 59.2 percent female (1992) Cairo City only.
Unemployment Rate 10 percent (1993), Cairo City only. Unemployment among women is estimated at
20.7 percent. Beyond the official unemployment rate, however, disguised unemployment or underemploy-
ment, is a severe problem in both the central and local government bureaucracy where the rate of disguised
unemployment may exceed 30 percent.
Income LE 2782 per capita (1992), Cairo City only. Real GDP per capita, which is based upon purchasing
power, was estimated at $2,570 for 1992/93 or about half of what the UNDP considers sufficient.
Water About 20 percent of Cairo's population, mostly in Giza and other peripheral areas, have no access to
piped water and use canals, wells and public water fountains, As much as half the water available is lost due
to leaks and breaks in water pipes.
Electricity More than 95 percent of households throughout Greater Cairo have electricity.
Sewerage Some three million people lack adequate sewerage. In the 1970s, prior to an internationally
financed upgrading of some of the sewerage system, over 100 incidents of sewerage flooding occurred daily.
Telephones 510 per 1000 households (Cairo City only, 1992).
Public Safety In a 1990 study, the murder rate in Cairo was cited as less than five per 100,000 population
per year. This was on a par with most Asian cities and similar to murder rates in cities in Britain/the United
Kingdom. Murder rates in such US cities as New York; Washington, DC; and Miami were between 10 and
20 per 100,000.
—Compiled by Sally Ethelston
Sources Egypt Human Development Report 1995, (Cairo, Egypt: Institute of National Planning, 1995); Cities: Lite in the World's 100
Largest Metropolitan Areas, (Washington, DC: Population Action International. 1990), United Nations Population Division Population
Growth and Policies in Mega-Cities: Cairo, (New York: United Nations, 1990); World Resources Institute, el al World Resources 1996-
97, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
pens only in rare cases where opposition
parties are involved in local disputes.12
Although many Islamic associations are
indeed involved in welfare activities, they
rarely result in social mobilization and
group activity. The impetus behind such
institutions as Islamic clinics or associa-
tions ("social Islam"), like their Christian
counterparts, is largely a combination of
religious/moral, social and economic con-
cerns. Pew expound an explicit political
agenda with the aim of collective mobili-
zation."
Political patronage in other impover-
ished countries sometimes leads
inadvertently to social and political mo-
bilization when patrons bargain with
their poor clients in their pursuit of po-
litical power. The mobilization of street
vendors in Mexico City is partially the
result of this type of political patronage.14
In Cairo, however, patronage appears to
work more through individual channels,
which rarely leads to the organization of
group activities.
Today, the legacy of Nasserite popu-
lism continues to influence the political
behavior of ordinary people. Nasserism
established a social contract between the
popular classes and the state, whereby
the state agreed to provide the basic ne-
cessities in exchange for popular support,,
social peace and, consequently, demobili-
zation. This was an agreement between
the state and a shapeless mass, an ag-
gregate of individuals and corporate
institutions, in which the idea of a plu-
ral, independent and critical collectivity
was seriously undermined. While the so-
cial contract is waning and market forces
are escalating unheeded, many Egyp-
tians still look to the government as the
main source of protection as well as mis-
fortune.
The legacy of this social contract has
also contributed to the tendency of many
ordinary urban Egyptians to seek indi-
vidualistic solutions to their problems. At
the same time, the lack of solidarity
among the different strata of the poor un-
dermines broad scale social or political
mobilization. More often than not, fami-
lies of different social strata tend to
compete when resources are scarce. In
Cairo, this is more so in the new and hct-
erogenous communities (such as Dar
al-Salam or Kafr Seif) than in the Old
City neighborhoods where the relative ho-
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mogeneity of inhabitants and the longevity of residence have
produced a spatial identity. The coexistence of identifiable strata
in a community (such as Kafr Seif where "villagers," "newcom-
ers," "shanty-dwellers" and "tent-dwellers" live side by side)
sharpens the existing competition and leads to conflicts. In Kafr
Seif, "villagers" feared that "shanty-dwellers" and "tent-dwell-
ers" would jeopardize their own insecure position; the latter
groups remained silent so as to not be noticed by the munici-
pality. Consequently, with solidarity being intangible among
the many poor Cairenes, recourse to the state—the provider
and the punisher—becomes an alternative way to achieve their
goals. Many of them know, however, that the bureaucracy is
unable or unwilling to respond formally to the growing demands
of the urban poor. Thus, they tend to seek informal, individual-
istic and opportunistic ways of cultivating officials.
Quiet Encroachment
The dearth of cooperative and contentious collective action on
the part of the Egyptian urban poor by no means implies a lack
of grassroots activism. Conditioned by political and cultural
constraints, the poor instead resort to an alternative strategy—
that of quiet encroachment. Qualitatively different from
defensive measures or coping mechanisms, this strategy rep-
resents a silent, protracted, pervasive advancement of ordinary
people—through open-ended and fleeting struggles without
Dnvirl Sims. A Plncc to LnirAThc American University in Cniro Press
clear leadership, ideology or structured organization—on the
propertied and powerful in order to survive. Wbile these types
of grassroots activities are not social movements, they are also
distinct from survival strategies or "everyday resistance" in
that the struggles and gains of the agents are not at the cost of
their fellow poor or themselves, but of the state, the rich and
the powerful. In this type of struggle, the poor, to provide light
for their shelter, tap electricity not from their neighbors, but
from the municipality; or instead of putting their children to
work to raise their living standard they demand higher pay
from their employers. These struggles are not, necessarily de-
fensive, but cumulatively encroaching—the actors tend to
expand their space by winning new positions from which to
move. In this sense, they do not constitute "accommodating
protest"15 since, first, they are not conscious acts of protest, but
rather represent the way people live their lives. This quiet
encroachment challenges many fundamental aspects of the
state's prerogatives—including the meaning of order, control
of public space, the importance of modernity, and finally, the
state's encroachment on private property.'"
Thus, to escape from high rents, millions of rural migrants
and the urban poor in Cairo have quietly claimed state/public
lands and cemeteries on the outskirts of the city, creating
largely autonomous communities. Greater Cairo contains
more than 111 ashwa'iyyat (spontaneous communities) that
house over six million people who have put up their shelters
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unlawfully. Cairo is also characterized hy another form of en-
croachment—the informal addition of rooms, balconies and
extra space in and on buildings. Those who formally have
been given housing in public projects built by the state, ille-
gally redesign and rearrange their space to suit their needs
by erecting partitions, and by adding and inventing new space.
(See Farha Ghannam in this issue.) Often whole communi-
ties emerge as a result of intense struggles and negotiations
between the poor and others in their daily lives. (See Petra
Kuppinger in this issue.)
Once settled, slum dwellers try to force state authori-
ties to extend water and electricity to their neighborhoods
by tapping into them illegally.'7 A cursory look at Cairo
Elections in Sayyida ZBinab, Cairn.
communities such as Dar al-Salam, Ezbat Sadat, Ezbat
Khairullah, Ezbat Nasr and Basaatin provides evidence of
this widespread phenomenon. In late April 1996, the mu-
nicipality reported that it had cut off 800 illegal electricity
lines in Cairo's Dar al-Salam and Basaatin communities
in one raid alone.18
In the domain of employment, street subsistence work-
ers have quietly taken over public thoroughfares to conduct
their business in the vast parallel economy. Well over 200,000
street vendors have occupied the streets in Cairo's main com-
mercial centers, encroaching on favorable business
opportunities created by local shopkeepers. Many streets
around major shopping areas in the neighborhoods of Muski,
al-Husayn, Embaba, Sayyida Zeinab, Boulaq and Abul-Alaa
have been transformed into street bazaars, through some of
which vehicles can no longer venture. Informality means
that not only are the agents generally free from the costs of
formality (taxes, regulation and so forth), they can also ben-
efit from the piracy of import commodities and, like many
others, theft of intellectual property. With six dollars of capi-
tal, a vendor can make up to 55 dollars a month.19
The polarization of wealth also creates opportunities for
the poor. The explosion of car ownership, for instance, has
meant that middle class as well as wealthy people now de-
pend daily on the poor to park and protect their cars in the
street. Thousands of Cairo's poor subsist on tips from park-
ing cars in the streets, which they control and organize in
such a way as to create maximum parking space. Many streets
have thus turned into virtual parking lots controlled by work-
ing gangs with elaborate internal organization.
Quiet encroachment does not mean an absence of local
networks, organizations or oppositional collective action. In-
deed, networks are established, not only
as a mechanism to ensure survival and en-
croachment, but also as a means to
safeguard gains already won. Thus, with-
out support from and cooperation among
kin members who tend to reside in the
same vicinity or work in similar occupa-
tions, the consolidation of the gains of the
poor would be extremely difficult. For the
popular classes of Cairo, kinship is the most
significant source of solidarity.2" Family con-
nections help poor households circumvent
the legal/bureaucratic constraints to secur-
ing shelter, obtaining jobs and extending
governmental subsidies.
While structured neighborhood meet-
ings are rare, widespread, albeit casual,
networks ensure the flow of information
among community members. Although
people rarely elect their local leaders, nev-
ertheless, charismatic leaders do emerge
out of seemingly inactive communities.
Similarly, in the domain of work, although
the spread of street vending takes place on
a largely individual basis, security is en-
sured by spatial networks embodied in "market sheikhs."
These informal leaders, selected by their seniority, experience
and skill, mediate between the vendors and the government/
public. Their strategy of quiet diplomacy among the "infor-
mal market sheikhs" is probably more effective than the formal
approaches of the official vendors' union.21
Traditional practices, solidarities and leaders thus have
taken the place of and perform some of the functions of more
structured neighborhood organizations found in other societ-
ies. But quiet encroachment as a type of grassroots activism
has both its costs as well as its advantages. It represents a
sustained, albeit silent, encroachment, that is largely unlaw-
ful and runs the constant risk of suppression. As fluid and
unstructured forms of activism, these largely atomistic strat-
egies have the advantages of flexibility and versatility; but
they fall short of developing legal, technical and organiza-
tional support needed to advance the search for social justice
on the broader, national level. •
Endnotes on page 12.
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